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A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei:
The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling
In June 1996, in the Hu-Lin (Tiger-Forest) Street evening market near Taipei City Hall in  east
downtown Taipei, we observed a fish auction whose form was remarkable. First the auctioneer held up
a basket and announced a price, which was fixed throughout the auction at 100 New Taiwan dollars,
about US$3.65 in 1996. He then put a series of approximately identical fish into the basket, one by one,
until some buyer signaled that he was willing to pay the fixed price for the fish that the basket then held,
at which point the sale was concluded. This process was repeated for as long as we watched, in a series
of auctions with the same kind of fish as numeraire and the same fixed money price for the basket.
1
This auction form, which we shall call the Taipei auction, is unusual in two respects. First, it
involves bundling, in that the price of the basket is set at a level at which competition requires the winner
to buy more than one fish to get any at all. Second, it is units of money rather than fish that are bundled,
with the auctioneer increasing the quantity of fish to be exchanged for a fixed money price instead of
decreasing the money price of a fixed quantity of fish.
Because increasing the quantity of fish is like decreasing their money price, and the first buyer to
signal his willingness wins the auction, the Taipei auction is like a conventional Dutch descending-price
auction with bundling, but with money bundled rather than fish, and fish as the numeraire rather than
money. To put it another way, because the price of fish is the quantity of money exchanged for a unit of
fish, the Taipei auction is dual to a conventional Dutch auction with bundling, with the conventional roles
of the quantity and price of fish reversed.
                                                
1The Hu-Lin Street evening market is targeted at working women and is famous for its low prices and variable quality.
The fish were one to two pounds each, and the basket when sold usually contained half a dozen or more. After
closing the sale, the seller added one small fish of a different species as lagniappe, which we ignore in our analysis.
That seller was the only one in the market using this auction form. The seller was still in the same location in January
2000, with a different auctioneer but using the same auction form. At that time the auctioneer also used some more
complex auction forms, but in all of them the market was cleared by varying the quantity of seafood rather than its
money price. In one case, for instance, she proposed that ten buyers share a given basket of shrimp for 300 New
Taiwan dollars each, about US$9.75 in 2000. When only five buyers signaled their willingness to accept, she reduced
the proposed number of buyers to nine, and the sale was concluded with eight buyers sharing the basket. In the
analysis we focus on the auction form described in the text, which is similar but analytically simpler.3
Bundling in auctions is unusual but not rare, and has been analyzed in the literature.
2 The duality
of the Taipei auction, however, is rare; and to our knowledge, the choice of numeraire in auctions has
not yet been studied. This paper studies the choice of numeraire and auction form in multi-object
auctions with bundling, with the goals of understanding the effects of duality, how the choice of
numeraire interacts with the choice of auction form—English or, equivalently, second-price; or Dutch or,
equivalently, first-price—and why duality is so rarely observed.
3
We assume, counterfactually but innocuously, that fish and money are homogeneous and
perfectly divisible, and we represent the seller's and the buyers' preferences by indirect utility functions
over fish and money left to spend on other commodities. Because a conventional auction and its dual
counterpart are isomorphic except for the interchanged roles of fish and money, an analysis of the
choice of numeraire must somehow break the symmetry between them. We do so by assuming that the
seller and the buyers have von Neumann-Morgenstern indirect utility functions that are quasilinear:
additively separable, linear in money, but strictly concave in fish. This is a plausible approximation for a
seller of perishable fish whose cost is sunk at the time of the auction, or for buyers who spend only a
small fraction of their budgets on fish.
The interaction between the choices of numeraire and auction form also depends on the seller's
and the buyers' information about buyers' preferences. We make assumptions that allow us to represent
each buyer's preferences by a scalar value parameter that describes his valuation of fish, relative to
money; and we use an independent private values model, in which the buyers' values are independent
draws from the same distribution, which is common knowledge. All other aspects of the environment
are common knowledge. The independent private values model is a plausible model of an auction of a
familiar commodity whose quality is easy to judge, and which we presume is seldom purchased for
resale. Within this framework we consider three information conditions: the buyers' values are common
knowledge; the buyers' values are common knowledge among buyers, but unknown to the seller; and
the buyer's values are privately known.
                                                
2William Adams and Janet Yellen (1976), Eric Maskin and John Riley (1984a), and R. Preston McAfee, John McMillan,
and Michael Whinston (1989) analyze tied sales of heterogeneous goods by a monopolist. Roger Myerson (1981)
and Kala Krishna (1993) analyze tied sales of homogeneous goods in multi-object auctions.4
Section I introduces our model and briefly discusses possible roles for bundling in a sequence of
auctions like the Taipei auction, taking the choice of numeraire as given. Sections II-IV consider the
choice of auction form and numeraire under the three information conditions. There we take bundling as
given and assume that the seller chooses the bundle that is optimal in each auction considered in
isolation, ignoring that it is part of a sequence. The possible relationships among the seller's equilibrium




























Values commonly known Values unknown to seller Values privately known
When the buyers' values are common knowledge, English and Dutch auctions with a given
numeraire yield identical equilibrium outcomes, in which the auction is won by the highest valuer of fish,
who pays money for the bundle of fish or receives fish in exchange for the bundle of money in an amount
that makes the second-highest valuer indifferent between winning and losing. In this case, a conventional
auction, English or Dutch, and its dual counterpart yield the same outcome, so the choice of numeraire
cannot be explained by the asymmetry in how fish and money enter preferences. Even with complete
information, the seller's optimal choice of bundle causes a subtle inefficiency: The bundle is determined
by the tradeoff between the seller's and the second-highest valuer's preferences, and is therefore too
small to maximize the surplus generated by the exchange that actually takes place between the seller and
the highest valuer.
When buyers' values are common knowledge among buyers but unknown to the seller, English
and Dutch auctions with a given numeraire still yield identical equilibrium outcomes, in which the auction
is won by the highest valuer, who again pays money or receives fish according to the second-highest
value. Now, however, the choice of numeraire has real consequences, and conventional and dual
auctions yield different expected utilities and volumes of trade. From the seller's point of view, a
                                                                                                                                                            
3We have heard of other dual auctions in Taipei and Tuscany—both of cloth!—but these are the only other examples
we know of. Because the perishability of fish helps to motivate the assumptions on preferences we use to explain the
possible occurrence of dual auctions, the durability of cloth is a cause for concern, which we do not address here.5
conventional auction has an "insurance" advantage over a dual auction, because it induces uncertainty
only about the allocation of money, which is costless under our assumptions on preferences, while a dual
auction induces uncertainty about the allocation of fish, which is costly. This makes it possible for the
seller to realize higher expected utility with a conventional auction. Because the seller normally chooses
the auction form, this result yields a simple, plausible explanation of why dual auctions are so seldom
observed.
4
The welfare comparison between conventional and dual auctions is more complex for the
buyers. The same buyer wins the auction in each case, and other buyers are indifferent between auction
forms. In this version of our model, the buyers know all buyers' values, and the winning buyer's welfare
is determined by the difference between his value and the second-highest value, which is the same in
each case, and the size of the bundle. The seller's optimal fish bundle in a conventional auction is larger
than the amount of fish received by a buyer in its dual counterpart who wins when the second-highest
value is very high; the seller's optimal money bundle in a dual auction is smaller than the money paid by a
buyer in its conventional counterpart who wins when the second-highest value is very high; and such a
buyer always prefers the outcome of a conventional auction to that of its dual counterpart. Under a
plausible additional restriction on preferences, the seller's optimal fish bundle in a conventional auction is
larger than the amount of fish received by a buyer in its dual counterpart who wins when the second-
highest value is above its ex ante mean; the seller's optimal money bundle in a dual auction is smaller
than the money paid by a buyer in its conventional counterpart who wins when the second-highest value
is above its ex ante mean; and such a buyer always prefers the outcome of a conventional auction to that
of its dual counterpart. Without further restrictions on preferences and the distribution from which values
are drawn, these comparisons appear to be ambiguous for a buyer who wins when the second-highest
value is below its ex ante mean, who might prefer the outcome of a dual or a conventional auction. The
welfare comparison for the buyers remains ambiguous ex ante.
When the buyers' values are privately known, an English auction, conventional or dual, yields
the same outcome as when the buyers' values are common knowledge among buyers, because bidding
                                                
4As explained below, this result is not as straightforward as the insurance intuition suggests. Martin Weitzman's
(1974) analysis suggests that an analysis with more general assumptions on preferences could relate the seller's
preferences over auction forms to the relative concavities of the seller's and buyers' preferences over fish and money
and the extent of the seller's uncertainty about buyers' preferences.6
their true values is a dominant strategy. Thus, the results when the buyers' values are common
knowledge among the buyers but unknown to the seller extend immediately to English auctions with
privately known values.
Given the seller's fish bundle, a conventional Dutch auction with privately known values is a
standard Dutch auction of a single indivisible object with risk-neutral buyers. The auction is still won by
the highest valuer, who now pays a money price equal to the expectation of the second-highest value
conditional on his own value, on the assumption that it is the highest. From the seller's point of view, the
expectation of this price is the unconditional expectation of the second-highest value. Thus, for any
given bundle, the seller's expected revenue and utility are the same as in a conventional Dutch (or
English) auction when the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers, and a conventional
Dutch auction yields the seller the same expected revenue and utility as a conventional English auction,
an instance of the Revenue Equivalence Theorem (William Vickrey (1961), McAfee and McMillan
(1987, pp. 706-710)). The seller's optimal bundle is therefore also the same, so that a conventional
Dutch auction is equivalent to a conventional English auction from the seller's point of view.
With privately known values, a dual Dutch auction has a surprising advantage, which can
outweigh the insurance advantage of conventional auctions. A dual auction effectively converts the
buyers from risk-neutral (in money) to risk-averse (in fish), and in a dual Dutch auction with privately
known values, risk-averse buyers' uncertainty about other buyers' bids induces them to bid more
aggressively than if they were risk neutral (Charles Holt (1980), Maskin and Riley (1984b), McAfee
and McMillan (1987), p. 719). Under our assumptions on preferences, all buyers are equally risk-
averse, so in equilibrium the auction is still won by the highest valuer. However, the winning buyer
receives less fish for a given money bundle than with risk-neutral buyers; and the seller's expected utility
is higher, other things equal.
Other things are not equal, because the insurance advantage of conventional auctions persists
with privately known values. A conventional English or Dutch auction can yield the seller higher or lower
expected utility than a dual Dutch auction, depending on which advantage is more important. But with
privately known values (or values common knowledge among the buyers but unknown to the seller), a
dual English auction yields the seller lower expected utility than any of the other three auctions, because7
conventional auctions provide better insurance and a dual Dutch auction provides no worse insurance
but elicits more aggressive bidding.
Our observations in the Hu-Lin Street evening market make it intriguing that the potential for
improving on conventional auctions depends on the auction being both dual and Dutch. Our results for
this case provide a possible rationale for the Taipei auction, and suggest that the conjunction of duality
and Dutchness may not have been coincidental.
5
I. The Model and Possible Roles for Bundling
  This section introduces the model and discusses possible roles for bundling, taking the choice of
numeraire as given for now. We assume that both fish and money are homogeneous and perfectly
divisible. There is one seller, with an initial supply of fish F, and there are n = 2 buyers; we index the
seller i = 0 and the buyers i = 1,…,n. We assume that resale is impossible, and that the seller's and the
buyers' preferences over auction outcomes can be represented by von Neumann-Morgenstern utility
functions that are quasilinear: additively separable, linear in money, but strictly concave in fish. Agent i's
utility is ui(fi, mi) = vig(fi) + mi ,  i = 0,…n, where fi  is his allocation of fish and mi his allocation of
money; and the function g(·) is increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable. Here we assume, for
simplicity, that the seller's and the buyers' utilities for fish are all proportional to the same function, g(·).
All of our results and proofs go through immediately when the seller has a different utility function for fish
than the buyers, but the analysis would be significantly more complex if the utility function were allowed
to differ among the buyers. Most of our results also hold without strict concavity for the seller. We
normalize v0
  = 1 without loss of generality, so that u0(f0, m0) = g(f0) + m0 . The parameter vi
 describes
buyer i's marginal rate of substitution between fish and money, and determines both his reservation price
in money for any bundle of fish and his reservation price in fish for any bundle of money. A higher vi
represents a higher money value of fish for any given level of fi and mi, and from now on we use "higher
value" as a shorthand for "higher value of fish." For simplicity, we assume that vi 
 > 1, i = 1,…,n, and
we order the buyers so that (ignoring ties) v1 > v2 > … > vn
 > 1, so that efficiency requires an exchange
between the buyer and the seller whose value is highest.
                                                
5David Lucking-Reiley (1999) gives a good summary of evidence from field data and laboratory experiments, which
suggests that in practice, Dutch auctions may have other advantages over English auctions.8
We assume that ex ante, the vi, i = 1,…n, are independently and identically distributed, with
commonly known distribution function H(·) with bounded support [v
min, v
max], where v
min > 1. Thus, the
buyers are symmetric and have independent private values (for fish, measured in money, or for money,
measured in fish). The structure of the environment, including the auction form, is otherwise common
knowledge. We vary the informational assumptions within this framework, first allowing the buyers'
values to be common knowledge to the seller as well as the buyers, then to be common knowledge
among buyers but unknown to the seller, and finally to be privately known by each buyer. We focus on
symmetric Nash or Bayesian equilibria throughout.
We close this section by considering possible roles for bundling, following Krishna's (1993)
analysis of sequential versus bundled multi-object auctions. Krishna presents an example to show that
even when buyers' values are common knowledge, bundling can increase the seller's utility and the
efficiency of the allocation by eliminating the adverse effects of buyers' anticipations of pecuniary
externalities across sequential auctions. Her example involves one seller and two buyers, whose
preferences differ in a way that is inconsistent with our assumption that buyers' preferences have the
common form ui(fi, mi) = vig(fi) + mi. We therefore present an example like hers, but with buyers'
preferences that are more compatible with our assumptions, in which bundling also increases the seller's
utility and the efficiency of the allocation.
There are two buyers, one seller, and two identical fish. Let v0
 = 0, so that the seller values only
money; this is inconsistent with our normalization but inessential, and could easily be relaxed. Let g(1) =
2, g(2) = 3, v1
 = 5, and v2 = 2, so that buyer 1's reservation prices are $10 for one fish and $15 for
two, and buyer 2's reservation prices are $4 for one fish and $6 for two. For simplicity, we respect the
indivisibility of fish, comparing a sequence of two auctions of one fish each with a single, bundled auction
of both fish. We also focus on conventional auctions.
6
When the buyers' values are common knowledge, a conventional auction, English or Dutch, is
always won by the highest valuer, at a price at least approximately equal to the second-highest value. In
sequential auctions, however, the buyers' subgame-perfect equilibrium bidding strategies must reflect
their rational anticipations of how the outcome of the current auction will influence the outcome of
                                                
6When values are common knowledge, the analogous dual auctions yield the same allocations (Proposition 1).9
subsequent auctions. In our example, in a sequence of two auctions of one fish at a time, buyer 1 must
win the second auction because his value is higher, but at a price that depends on whether buyer 2 won
the first auction, due to the diminishing marginal value of fish. There is a unique subgame-perfect
equilibrium, in which buyer 2 wins the first auction despite his lower value for fish, paying $3, and buyer
1 then wins the second auction, paying $2. In this equilibrium buyer 1's utility is 8; buyer 2's utility is 1;
and the seller's utility is 5.
7 By contrast, in a single, bundled auction of both fish, buyer 1 wins and pays
$6, and his utility is 9; buyer 2 loses, pays nothing, and his utility is 0; and the seller receives $6, and his
utility is 6. Thus, the bundled auction both allocates the fish more efficiently and yields the seller higher
revenue: Everyone but buyer 2 is better off, and compensation could yield a Pareto-improvement.
When buyers' values are not observable by the seller, bundling in a multi-object auction can also
be useful in sorting buyers with independent private values. This role of bundling is present in Myerson's
(1981) analysis of optimal auctions (but not the main focus), in Maskin and Riley's (1984a) analysis of
optimal monopolistic quantity discounting, and in McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston's (1989) analysis of
optimal monopolistic bundling of heterogeneous goods.
8
II. Equivalence of Conventional and Dual Auctions with Commonly Known Values
In the rest of the paper, we take the occurrence of bundling as given and study the effect of
auction form and choice of numeraire on the allocation generated by a single, bundled auction under
alternative informational assumptions. To focus on these issues, we assume from now on that the seller
and the buyers ignore strategic interactions with any subsequent auctions; that their preferences over
outcomes of the current auction can be described by von Neumann-Morgenstern indirect utility
functions that satisfy the assumptions in Section I; and the seller chooses the optimal bundle, given the
auction form. For simplicity, we also assume that g(·) satisfies the Inada condition  , ) ( ' lim ¥ = ¥ ﬁ f g f
so that the seller's optimal bundle is always interior.
                                                
7If buyer 1 deviated, bidding just high enough to win both auctions, he would win fish worth 15 to him, paying
4 + 4 = 8 for them, for a utility of 7 rather than 8.
8In a common-values framework, Donald Hausch (1986) identifies a third possible role of bundling, eliminating buyers'
incentives to underbid to avoid revealing private information that reduces their gain in subsequent auctions; but that
role is not relevant in the independent private values model studied here.10
In this section, we assume that buyers' values are commonly known to the seller as well as the
buyers. Given the seller's bundle, an English or Dutch auction, conventional or dual, is a standard
auction of a single, indivisible object. When the buyers' values are common knowledge, in equilibrium
each auction is won by the highest valuer of fish, who pays money for the bundle of fish or receives fish
in exchange for the bundle of money in an amount that makes the second-highest valuer indifferent
between winning and losing. Given this, and recalling that v1 > v2 > … > vn
 > 1, in a conventional
auction the seller's optimal fish bundle, f 
c, solves the problem:
(1) m f F g + - ) ( max s. t.  ). ( 2 f g v m =
f 
c then determines the money price, m
c, via the auction. In a dual auction the seller's optimal money
bundle, m
d, also solves problem (1). m
d then determines the amount of fish received, f 
d, via the auction.
With commonly known values, the constraint in problem (1) makes m a known, increasing




d, thereby determining f 
d. This proves our first result:
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that the buyers' values are common knowledge. Then, in an English
or Dutch auction, conventional or dual, the highest valuer wins the auction, paying money or
receiving fish according to the second-highest value. The seller's optimal fish bundle in a
conventional auction equals the amount of fish received by the winning buyer in its dual
counterpart; the seller's optimal money bundle in a dual auction equals the money paid by the
winning buyer in its conventional counterpart; and all four auctions yields the same outcome.
Thus, when the buyers' values are common knowledge, the rarity of dual auctions cannot be
explained by our assumed asymmetry in how fish and money enter agents' preferences.
Even with complete information, the seller's choice of bundle causes inefficiency:
PROPOSITION 2: Suppose that the buyers' values are common knowledge. Then, in an English
or Dutch auction, conventional or dual, the seller's optimal bundle is too small and the volume of
trade is too low for efficiency.11
PROOF: By Proposition 1, all four auctions yield the same exchange of money for fish, and the seller's
optimal bundle maximizes g(F- f) + v2 g(f), in a conventional auction directly by choice of f
  c, and in a
dual auction indirectly by choice of m
d, with f
 d 
 determined by the constraint of (1). Standard arguments
then show that maximizing g(F- f) + v2 g(f), the surplus from a hypothetical exchange between the seller
and the second-highest valuer, yields a bundle too small to maximize g(F- f) + v1 g(f), the surplus from
the exchange between the seller and the highest valuer that actually takes place in equilibrium. This
completes the proof.
This tendency for the seller's bundle to be inefficiently small plainly persists when the buyers'
values are not commonly known, but we do not discuss this issue further below.
III. Conventional versus Dual Auctions with Values Unknown to the Seller
In this section, we assume that the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but
unknown to the seller. In this case, for a given choice of numeraire, English and Dutch auctions are both
won by the highest valuer, who pays money or receives fish according to the second-highest value.
Thus, we need only distinguish between conventional and dual auctions.
In a conventional auction, the seller's optimal fish bundle, f 
c, is the value of f that solves:
(2) ] ) ( [ max m f F g E + -   s. t.   ). ( 2 f g v m =
The seller's choice of f 
c and the realization of the random variable v2 together determine the money
price, m
c, via the auction. The expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of v2,
the second-highest value in n independent draws from the distribution H(·). In a dual auction, the seller's
optimal money bundle, m
d, is the value of m that solves problem (2), but now m
d and the realization of
v2 together determine the amount of fish received, f 
d, via the auction. The expectation is taken over the
distribution of f 
d induced by the distribution of v2.
We stress that when the buyers' values are unknown to the seller, in a conventional auction f 
c is
deterministic and m
c is random, while in a dual auction m
d is deterministic and f 
d is random. As a result,12
even though f 
c and m
d solve the "same" problem with different forms of uncertainty, and in equilibrium
each auction yields an exchange between the buyer and the highest valuer, who pays money or receives
fish according to the second-highest value, conventional and dual auctions yield different volumes of
trade and expected utilities.
Given our assumptions that g(·) is concave and satisfies an Inada condition, the second-order
conditions of problem (2) are always satisfied, and its solutions are always interior. f 
c is therefore
determined by the first-order condition
















d is determined by the first-order condition
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Because the seller is bound by his limited supply of fish, f 
c = F and, for all realizations of v2, f 
d
= F, so that m
d = v
ming(F). Given the Inada condition, (3) rules out violations of the first constraint; and
(4) rules out violations of the second constraint with positive probability and therefore, given the
continuity of H(·), rules out any violations of the second constraint at all.
The function g
-1(·) is positive, increasing, and convex, and the function ?(·) is positive and
increasing. Our assumptions on g(·) do not determine the curvature of ?(·), but ?(·) is convex for many
common parameterizations of utility functions, and this appears to be the normal case.
Our first result for the case where the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers
but unknown to the seller establishes the seller's preference for conventional auctions:
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but
unknown to the seller. Then, in an English or Dutch auction, conventional or dual, the highest
valuer wins the auction, paying money or receiving fish according to the second-highest value. A
conventional English and a conventional Dutch auction yield the same outcome, and a dual13
English and a dual Dutch auction yield the same outcome. However, a conventional auction
always yields the seller higher expected utility than its dual counterpart.
PROOF: The proofs of the first parts are immediate. To prove the last part, note that in a conventional
auction it is feasible for the seller to set f = Ef 
d, the expected amount of fish received for the seller's
optimal money bundle, m
d, in a dual auction. f 
c must therefore yield him an expected utility at least as
high as Ef 
d and the distribution of m = v2 g(Ef 
d) it induces. Thus,
(5) )] ( ][ [ ) ( )] ( [ ) ( ] ) ( [ 2 2
d d d d c c Ef g Ev Ef F g Ef g v E Ef F g m f F g E + - = + - ‡ + -  
, ) ( )] ( [ ) ( )] ( ][ [ ) ( 2 2
d d d d d d m f F Eg f g v E f F Eg f Eg Ev f F Eg + - = + - > + - >
where the inequalities follow from revealed preference, the strict concavity of g(·) and Jensen's
inequality, and the fact that v2 and f 
d are negatively correlated. This completes the proof.
REMARK: The seller's preference for conventional over dual auctions stems from the fact that from his
point of view, a conventional auction induces uncertainty only about the allocation of money, which is
costless, while a dual auction induces uncertainty about the allocation of fish, which is costly. However,
the proof is not a direct translation of this insurance intuition, and it shows that the seller's preference
requires only that either the seller or the winning buyer is strictly risk averse in the relevant range, even
though the buyers bear no uncertainty. In fact the seller's preference extends to the case where both he
and the buyers are risk-neutral. There, in each case, his welfare increases with the volume of trade. In a
conventional auction he can set f 
c = F, realizing expected utility Ev2F. In a dual auction, because g(·)
no longer satisfies the Inada condition we must impose the constraint  m
d = v
minF to ensure that f 
d =
m
d/v2 = F. He therefore sets m
d = v
minF, realizing expected utility less than Ev2F. Thus, with risk-
neutrality Proposition 3's conclusion remains valid because the first inequality in (5) is strict.
The buyers' welfare comparison is also more complex than the insurance intuition:14
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but
unknown to the seller. Then the same buyer wins the auction, whether it is conventional or dual,
and losing buyers are indifferent between conventional and dual auctions.  f 
c, the seller's optimal
fish bundle in a conventional auction, is larger than g
–1(m
d/v
max), and therefore larger than the
amount of fish received by a buyer in its dual counterpart who wins when v2 ˜ v
max; m
d, the
seller's optimal money bundle in a dual auction, is smaller than m
c = g(f 
c)v
max, and therefore
smaller than the amount of money paid by a buyer in its conventional counterpart who wins
when v2 ˜ v
max; and such a buyer prefers the outcome of a conventional auction to that of its dual




d/v2), the amount of fish received by a buyer in its dual counterpart who wins
when the second-highest value is v2; in a dual auction m
d < m
c = v2 g(f 
c), the money paid by a
buyer in its conventional counterpart who wins when the second-highest value is v2; and any
buyer who wins when v2 = Ev2 prefers the outcome of a conventional auction to that of its dual
counterpart.
PROOF: It is clear that the highest valuer still wins the auction in each case, paying money or receiving
fish according to the second-highest value, and that losing buyers are indifferent between conventional
and dual auctions. In this version of our model the buyers know all buyers' values, and therefore bear no
uncertainty in equilibrium. In a conventional auction, the winning buyer pays money price m
c = v2g(f 
c)
for the fish bundle f 
c, realizing utility (v1 - v2)g(f 





d/v2) units of fish in exchange for the money bundle m
d, realizing utility (v1-v2)g(f 
d). Thus, to show
that a buyer who wins when v2 ˜ v
max realizes higher utility in a conventional auction, and to justify the
comparisons of the amounts exchanged in this case, we need only show that g(f 
c) > m
d/v
max (= g(f 
d)
when v2 = v
max). Suppose, per contra, that g(f 
c) = m
d/v
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where the equalities are from the first-order conditions (3) and (4) and the inequalities follow from the
facts that ?(·) and g
-1(·) are increasing, and from Jensen's inequality. The contradiction in (6) establishes
the results for v2 ˜  v
max. To show that if ?(·) is convex, a buyer who wins when v2 = Ev2 realizes higher
utility in a conventional auction, and to justify the comparisons of the amounts exchanged in this case, it
suffices to show that g(f 
c) > m
d/Ev2, because if v2 = Ev2,  g(f 
d) = m
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where the inequalities follow from the facts that ?(·) and g
-1(·) are increasing, that the random variables
in brackets at the end of the first line are positively correlated, from Jensen's inequality, and from the
convexity of ?(·). This contradiction completes the proof of Proposition 4.
REMARK: Without further restrictions, Proposition 4's comparisons appear to be ambiguous for a
buyer who wins when v2 < Ev2, who might prefer the outcome of a conventional auction or its dual
counterpart. The welfare comparison for buyers is also ambiguous ex ante, where comparing E[(v1 -
v2)g(f 
c)] and E[(v1 - v2)g(f 
d)] is further complicated by the correlation between (v1 - v2) and f 
d. The
ambiguity also extends to the case where the buyers' values are privately known, but we do not discuss
this issue further below.
IV. Dual Dutch versus other Auction Forms with Privately Known Values
In this section, we assume that each buyer's value is privately known. In an English auction,
conventional or dual, the buyers' uncertainty about each other's values has no effect:
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that the buyers' values are privately known. Then, in an English
auction, conventional or dual, the seller's optimal bundle and the auction outcome are the same
as when the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but unknown to the seller.
Thus, the highest valuer wins the auction, paying money or receiving fish according to the16
second-highest value; a conventional English auction always yields the seller higher expected
utility than a dual English auction; and Proposition 4's comparisons of the buyers' welfares and
the amounts exchanged remain valid for English auctions.
PROOF: When the buyers' values are privately known, in an English auction it is a dominant strategy for
a buyer to bid his true value. The seller's optimal bundle is therefore still determined by problem (2), the
outcome is the same as when buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but unknown to
the seller, and the conclusions of Propositions 3 and 4 remain valid. This completes the proof.
By contrast, in a Dutch auction with privately known values, the buyers bear uncertainty about
each other's bids, which makes it possible for the outcome to differ from the outcome when the buyers'
values are common knowledge among the buyers but unknown to the seller.
In a conventional Dutch auction, the effect of this difference is limited:
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that the buyers' values are privately known. Then, in a conventional
Dutch auction, the highest valuer wins the auction, at a money price equal to the expectation of
the second-highest value conditional on his own value, on the assumption that it is the highest.
For any given bundle, the seller's expected revenue and utility are the same as in a conventional
English auction. A conventional Dutch auction therefore has the same optimal bundle as a
conventional English auction and yields the seller the same expected utility, which is higher than
his expected utility in a dual English auction.
PROOF: Given the seller's fish bundle, a conventional Dutch auction with privately known values is
equivalent to a standard single-object auction with risk-neutral seller and buyers. Thus, in symmetric
equilibrium the bundle is always won by the highest valuer, who pays a money price equal to the
expectation of the second-highest value conditional on his own value, on the assumption that it is the
highest (which is the appropriate assumption because a buyer's bid influences the outcome only when his
value is the highest). From the point of view of the seller, who does not know v1, the expectation of this
price is E(E[v2g(f 
c)|v1]) = Ev2g(f 
c) by the law of iterated expectations, where the first expectation is17
taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of v1. Thus, although conventional English and Dutch
auctions yield different equilibrium relationships between the buyers' values and the auction price, for
any given bundle the seller's expected revenue (and utility) are the same, an instance of the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem (William Vickrey (1961), McAfee and McMillan (1987, pp. 706-710)).
Conventional English and Dutch auctions therefore have the same optimal bundles and yield the seller
the same expected utility. By Propositions 3 and 5, this expected utility is the same as in a conventional
English or Dutch auction when the buyers' values are common knowledge among the buyers but
unknown to the seller, and it is higher than the seller's expected utility in a dual English auction when the
buyers' values are either common knowledge among the buyers or privately known. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 6 shows that with privately known values, the seller is still indifferent between a
conventional Dutch and a conventional English auction, and that he prefers both to a dual English
auction. These relationships are simple consequences of revenue equivalence and the insurance
advantage of conventional over dual auctions identified in Proposition 3.
It remains to consider the seller's welfare in a dual Dutch auction. There, the buyers' uncertainty
about each other's bids has a significant effect on the outcome, which gives a dual Dutch auction a
potential advantage over a conventional English or Dutch auction or, a fortiori, a dual English auction. A
dual auction effectively converts the buyers from risk-neutral (in money) to risk-averse (in fish), and in a
dual Dutch auction with privately known values, risk-averse buyers' uncertainty about other buyers' bids
induces them to bid more aggressively than if they were risk neutral (Charles Holt (1980), Maskin and
Riley (1984b), McAfee and McMillan (1987), p. 719). The winning buyer therefore receives less fish
for a given money bundle than with risk-neutral buyers; and the seller's expected utility is higher, other
things equal. However, the insurance advantage of conventional auctions persists with privately known
values. The seller always prefers a dual Dutch auction to a dual English auction, but he can prefer either
a conventional English or Dutch auction or a dual Dutch auction, depending on whether the benefits of
more aggressive bidding outweigh the benefits of insurance.18
It is intriguing that the potential for improving on conventional auctions depends on the auction
being both dual and Dutch. Our results for this case provide a possible rationale for the Taipei auction,
and suggests that its conjunction of duality and Dutchness was not coincidental.
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PROPOSITION 7: Suppose that the buyers' values are privately known. Then, in a dual Dutch
auction, the highest valuer wins the auction; but the bidding is more aggressive than if each
buyer's bid were directly determined by the expectation of the second-highest value conditional
on his own value, on the assumption that it is the highest, with the result that the winning buyer
receives less fish for a given money bundle. This more aggressive bidding benefits the seller,
other things equal, and can outweigh the insurance advantage of conventional auctions. The
seller's expected utility is always higher in a dual Dutch auction than in a dual English auction,
but it can be either higher or lower than in a conventional English or Dutch auction.
PROOF: Given the seller's money bundle, a dual Dutch auction with privately known values is a
standard single-object auction with risk-averse seller and buyers. Under our assumptions all of the
buyers are equally risk averse, so in symmetric equilibrium the highest valuer still wins the auction (Holt
(1980), pp. 436-439). Holt's results also imply that in a dual Dutch auction with money bundle m, the
winning (lowest) fish bid can be written f(v1) = g
-1(m/b(v1)), where b(·) is an increasing, continuous, and
differentiable function. Further, the bidding is strictly more aggressive than with risk-neutral buyers, so
that there exists a  0
min > b  such that
(8)   ) | ( ) ( 1 2
min
1 v v E b v b + ‡  for all  . 1 v
The seller's optimal money bundle, m
d, is then the value of m that solves the problem:
(9) ], )]) ( / [ ( [ max 1
1 m v b m g F g E + -
-  
                                                
9The dual Dutch auction is still not optimal, but the optimal auction may be difficult to implement because it involves
complex subsidization of high bidders who lose and penalization of low bidders (Maskin and Riley (1984b), McAfee
and McMillan (1987), pp. 718-720)). With correlated values, the information about buyers' values revealed during an
English auction may result in higher revenue to the seller than in a Dutch auction, despite the advantage of the Dutch
auction noted here (Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber (1982)).19
where the expectation is taken with respect to the unconditional distribution of v1. Because g(·) satisfies
an Inada condition, the solution of (9) must be interior; and given the fact that ?(·) and
g
-1(·) are increasing, m
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To see that the seller's expected utility in a dual Dutch auction can be lower than in a
conventional English or Dutch auction, suppose that g(·) is linear, so that the seller and buyers are risk-
neutral. This violates our assumptions, but can be smoothed so that g(·) is slightly strictly concave
everywhere but near 0, where it is concave enough to satisfy our Inada condition; a continuity argument
will then yield the desired conclusion.
When g(·) is linear, the seller's welfare increases with the volume of trade. Because g(·) no
longer satisfies the Inada condition we must impose the constraints f 
c = F and m
d = v
minF to ensure that
f 
d  = F. In a conventional auction, the seller has a boundary maximum at f 
c = F, receiving expected
revenue Ev2F for the fish bundle F, and realizing expected utility Ev2F. In a dual Dutch auction, the
seller again has a boundary maximum at m
d = v
minF. Each buyer's fish bid is directly determined by the
expectation of the second-highest value conditional on his own value, on the assumption that it is the
highest, so the winning buyer receives f 
d = m
d/E(v2|v1) units of fish and the seller's expected utility is
(11) F Ev v v E F Ev F E F v v v E F v F E 2 1 2 2
min
1 2
min )) | ( / ( )) | ( / ( + - < + -
, )]) | ( [ / ( 2 2 1 2 2 F Ev F Ev v v E E F Ev F E = + - <
where the inequalities follow from the fact that his expected utility is increasing in m
d, and from Jensen's
inequality. Thus, with risk-neutrality, the seller strictly prefers a conventional English or Dutch auction to
a dual Dutch auction, and smoothing and continuity yield the conclusion.20
To see that the seller's expected utility in a dual Dutch auction can be higher than in a





max – 1. Now imagine that the distribution H(·) shifts rightwards, preserving
its shape, with v
min, v
max ? 8. Suppressing the dependence of variables on v
min and v
max, it is clear from
Proposition 6 and (3) that in a conventional Dutch auction, f 
c ?  F, so that the seller's equilibrium
expected utility approaches g(0) + Ev2 g(F) in the limit. In a dual Dutch auction, as v
min, v
max ? 8, it is
clear that b(v1) ? 8 for all v1. It then follows from (10) that  ¥ ﬁ
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d/b(v1)) ?  F for all v1, so m
d ?  Eb(v1)g(F). Because the winning buyer's bid maximizes the
probability of winning times his utility when he wins, v1g(f) - m, as m




max, and E(v2|v1) - v
max all converge to limits for which (8) holds. Taking expectations in (8), the seller's
equilibrium expected utility in a dual Dutch auction approaches g(0) + Eb(v1)g(F) = g(0) + [b
min + Ev2]
g(F) in the limit, which is strictly greater than the seller's equilibrium expected utility in a conventional
auction, completing the proof.




d/b(v1)) collapses on F, while the winning fish bid has a nonnegligible effect on the seller's
welfare. The reason is that in the limit, the buyers compete by tiny variations in their bid amounts of
extremely valuable fish, which despite their small size have nonnegligible effects on the seller's money
revenue and expected utility.
Finally, we stress that our limiting argument in the second part of the proof is just a device to
show that it is possible for the seller to prefer a dual Dutch auction; there is no reason to suppose that
for low values, the seller must prefer a conventional auction. When H(·) is uniform, with v
min = v
max – 1;21
F = 100; and 
k f f g
/ 1 ) ( ” , numerical solutions yield expected utilities for the seller in a conventional
English or Dutch auction, a dual English auction, and a dual Dutch auction, respectively, as follows:




2 25.39, 24.65, 24.92 12.77, 12.34, 12.51 9.10,  8.75, 8.86
3 33.33, 33.96, 34.19 17.12, 16.68, 16.84 12.10, 11.74, 11.85
4 43.33, 43.50, 43.71 21.57, 21.12, 21.26 15.13, 14.78, 14.89
5 53.33, 53.18, 53.37 26.08, 25.60, 25.74 18.21, 17.85, 17.95
6 63.33, 62.93, 63.10 29.40, 30.12, 30.25 20.03, 20.93, 21.03
7 73.33, 72.73, 72.90 34.04, 34.66, 34.79 23.19, 24.03, 24.12
Table 1. Seller's expected utilities in conventional, dual English, and dual Dutch auctions
Thus, the seller can prefer a dual Dutch auction to a conventional English or Dutch auction (or, a
fortiori, a dual English auction) for low to moderate values of v
min as well as high ones. It is apparent,
however, that even in this simple example the comparison varies in a complex and nonmonotonic way:
When k = 2, for instance, the seller prefers a dual Dutch auction when v
min = 3, 4, or 5, and a
conventional English or Dutch auction when v
min = 2, 6, or 7.22
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